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INTRODUCTION 
While the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) provides comprehensive 
protection for people with disabilities in several areas of life, including 
employment, questions about its scope and effectiveness remain. In addition to 
problems completing tasks at the workplace, many individuals with disabilities 
have difficulty getting to and from the workplace. Public transportation may be an 
unavailable, or an unacceptable, solution because it is often unreliable and may 
prevent an employee from getting to work on time. Employees with disabilities 
may therefore be unable to get to work without commuting-related 
accommodations and thus may be unable to keep their jobs though they are 
otherwise qualified for the position. 
Recently, courts have split over whether the ADA’s reasonable 
accommodations framework imposes on employers an obligation to 
accommodate employees’ commuting-related difficulties. Commuting-related 
accommodations can range from requests for parking spaces1 and modified work 
schedules on one end of the spectrum to employer-paid transportation and 
telecommuting on the other. While cases involving requests for schedule changes2 
and parking spaces have found success in the Second,3 Ninth,4 and Third5 
Circuits, they have met resistance in other circuits, including the Seventh6 and 
Eighth Circuits.7 
Courts addressing requests for commuting-related accommodations have 
split over whether these accommodations are outside the scope of the ADA. The 
Seventh,8 Eighth,9 and Eleventh10 Circuits have held that commuting-related 
accommodations are outside the scope of the ADA and are thus not required. The 
Third Circuit also followed this approach prior to deciding Colwell v. Rite Aid in 
 
1. Parking space accommodations have generally been treated by courts as commuting-related 
because they are provided outside of the physical bounds of the workplace and often stem from an 
employee’s inability to walk long distances. E.g., Lyons v. Legal Aid Soc’y, 68 F.3d 1512, 1516 (2d Cir. 
1995). 
2. 42 U.S.C. § 12111 (2006) (listing “modified work schedules” as possible reasonable 
accommodations).  
3. See, e.g., Lyons, 68 F.3d at 1516 (finding a request for a parking space to be a reasonable 
accommodation depending on certain factors). 
4. See, e.g., Livingston v. Fred Meyer Stores, Inc., 388 F. App’x 738, 741–43 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(reversing summary judgment for the defendant employer and holding that a request for day shifts 
could be reasonable under the circumstances). 
5. See, e.g., Colwell v. Rite-Aid, 602 F.3d 495, 506 (3d Cir. 2010) (finding a request for day shifts 
to be a reasonable accommodation). 
6. See, e.g., Bull v. Coyner, No. 97 C. 7583, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1905, at *25 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 
17, 2000). 
7. See, e.g., Young-Parker v. AT&T, 4:09-CV-00202, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114997, at *5–8 
(E.D. Ark. Apr. 29, 2009). 
8. See, e.g., Bull, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1905, at *25. 
9. See, e.g., Young-Parker, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114997. 
10. See, e.g., Salmon v. Dade Cnty. Sch. Bd., 4 F. Supp. 2d 1157 (S.D. Fla. 1998). 
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2010.11 Since 2010, however, the Second,12 Third,13 and Ninth14 Circuits have 
applied a flexible, case-by-case analysis that examines the requested 
accommodation and conducts a fact-specific inquiry into the reasonableness of 
providing such an accommodation. 
A case-by-case approach to commuting-related accommodations is most 
consistent with the language and purpose of the ADA’s Title I,15 which Congress 
enacted to provide a comprehensive prohibition on discrimination against 
individuals with disabilities in the workplace.16 This approach is also supported by 
the Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act of 2008 (ADAAA), wherein 
Congress mandated a less rigid interpretation of the ADA and broader protections 
for disabled individuals. It is imperative that courts use this case-by-case approach 
if the goals of the ADA—providing equal opportunities to disabled individuals 
and allowing such individuals to hold meaningful positions in society—are to be 
achieved. A case-by-case approach is consistent with the intent and goals of the 
ADA because it (1) forces employers to confront prejudices about employees with 
disabilities by engaging in an interactive, solution-oriented process, (2) aids 
employees with disabilities in achieving equal opportunities in terms of finances, 
and (3) enables employees with disabilities to hold meaningful positions in society 
by helping them access and retain gainful employment. 
Section I of this Note discusses the intent, history, and framework of the 
ADA as amended by the ADAAA and describes the case law and circuit split. 
Section II analyzes both approaches with a particular focus on the history and 
intent of the ADA; it argues that a case-by-case approach is the better approach 
based on the history and intent of the ADA and the subsequent ADAAA. Section 
III provides some guidance for implementing a case-by-case approach by 
producing several examples of accommodations that should be presumed to be 
reasonable, presumed to be unreasonable, or that should receive a fact-specific 
analysis to determine reasonableness. Because this Note attempts only to resolve a 
circuit split based on an analysis of the ADA’s legislative history and intent, it does 
not address the policy arguments regarding whether employers should be 
responsible for commuting-related accommodations; these arguments are complex 
 
11. Colwell v. Rite-Aid, 602 F.3d 495 (3d Cir. 2010). 
12. See, e.g., Lyons v. Legal Aid Soc’y, 68 F.3d 1512, 1516 (2d Cir. 1995) (finding a request for a 
parking space to be a reasonable accommodation). 
13. See, e.g., Colwell, 602 F.3d at 505–06 (finding that a request for day shifts could be a 
reasonable accommodation). 
14. See, e.g., Livingston v. Fred Meyer Stores, Inc., 388 F. App’x 738, 740–42 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(reversing summary judgment for the defendant employer and holding that a request for day shifts 
could be reasonable under the circumstances). 
15. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2006). 
16. See, e.g., Livingston, 388 F. App’x at 740–42 (reversing summary judgment for the defendant 
employer and holding that a request for day shifts could be reasonable under the circumstances). 
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enough to require their own separate note and are beyond the scope of this 
project. 
I. HISTORY, INTENT, AND FRAMEWORK OF THE ADA 
A. The Evolution of the ADA and Its Expansion Through the ADAAA 
Congress enacted the ADA to ensure equality for individuals with disabilities 
and to allow them to participate fully in society.17 As the first statute to provide a 
comprehensive set of rights to all Americans with disabilities,18 the ADA both 
prohibits discrimination in employment decisions and imposes on employers an 
affirmative duty to provide reasonable accommodations to qualified individuals 
with disabilities.19  
Under the ADA, individuals with disabilities are persons whose disability 
substantially limits a major life activity.20 Once the courts find a plaintiff statutorily 
disabled, the plaintiff must bear the burden of proving that he or she is also 
“qualified.”21 Qualified individuals are persons who can perform the essential 
functions of the job with or without the reasonable accommodations.22  
Congress amended the ADA through the ADAAA in 2008 in response to a 
line of Supreme Court cases that significantly limited the definition of a disability 
under the ADA.23 The first of these cases was Sutton v. United Air Lines, in which 
the Supreme Court held that mitigating measures must be taken into account 
when determining whether an individual is substantially limited in a major life 
activity.24 
The petitioners in Sutton were twin sisters suffering from severe myopia25 
who had applied to be airline pilots and had been rejected because they did not 
meet the uncorrected vision requirements. The Court held, however, that the 
sisters were not substantially limited in a major life activity and thus not disabled 
under the statute because they had 20/20 or better vision with corrective 
 
17. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101; see also Melissa Ann Resslar, PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin: A Hole in One 
for Casey Martin and the ADA, 33 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 631, 637 (2002) (noting that while the ADA was 
not the first statute enacted to prevent discrimination against disabled individuals, it is considered the 
“first comprehensive declaration of equality” for disabled individuals).  
18. Resslar, supra note 17, at 637. 
19. 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (2006). 
20. Id. § 12102 . 
21. Debra Burke & Malcom Abel, Ameliorating Medication and ADA Protection: Use It and Lose It 
or Refuse It and Lose It?, 38 AM. BUS. L.J. 785, 816–17 (2001); see id. § 12111 (2006) (defining “qualified 
individual”); id. § 12112 (prohibiting discrimination against a qualified individual). 
22. Id. § 12111.  
23. Americans with Disabilities Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. P.L. No. 110-325, § 2, 122 
Stat. 3553 (findings and purpose section). 
24. Sutton v. United Air Lines, 527 U.S. 471, 482 (1999). 
25. Id. at 475. 
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measures.26 Moreover, although the Equal Employment Opportunities 
Commission (EEOC) had issued interpretive guidance stating that disabilities 
should be assessed without reference to any mitigating measures, the Court noted 
that under the ADA, the EEOC did not have authority to issue these guidelines.27 
In dicta, the Court questioned the deference due to the EEOC regulations and 
reserved this question for a later date.28 
The Court further narrowed the definition of a disability under the ADA in 
Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams. First, the Court held that the 
appropriate inquiry for determining disability, defined as whether an individual is 
substantially limited in a major life activity, is whether an individual’s impairment 
has “prevented or restricted [him or her] from performing tasks that are of central 
importance to most people’s daily lives.”29 The Court also held that in order to 
qualify as a disability, the “impairment’s impact must . . . be permanent or long 
term.”30 
The plaintiff in Toyota was diagnosed with bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome 
and bilateral tendinitis, which limited her ability to lift and carry objects weighing 
more than a certain amount.31 The Court held that the plaintiff was not disabled 
under the statute32 and that Congress intended a “demanding standard for 
qualifying as disabled.”33 In doing so, it reasoned that if Congress meant to include 
all individuals with physical limitations, then the ADA’s findings section would 
cite a much higher number of individuals with disabilities then it did.34  
In response, Congress enacted the ADAAA in 2008, which legislatively 
overruled Sutton and Toyota by expanding the types of disabilities that are covered 
by the ADA.35 The ADAAA also expressed Congress’s disapproval of the strict 
interpretation and exacting standards that the Supreme Court and lower courts 
following Toyota and Sutton had imposed on ADA plaintiffs attempting to prove 
their disability.36 First, Congress provided that the ADAAA’s purpose is  
to convey that it is the intent of Congress that the primary object of 
attention in cases brought under the ADA should be whether entities 
covered under the ADA have complied with their obligations, and to 
 
26. Id. at 481–82. 
27. Id. at 479. 
28. Id. at 480. 
29. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 187 (2002). 
30. Id. at 198. 
31. Id. at 187–88. 
32. Id. at 187. 
33. Id. at 197. 
34. Id. at 197–98. 
35. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2006); see also Alex B. Long, Introducing the New and Improved Americans 
with Disabilities Act, 103 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 217 (2008). 
36. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2(b)(5), 122 Stat. 3553, 3554 
(2008). 
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convey that the question of whether an individual’s impairment is a 
disability under the ADA should not demand extensive analysis.37 
Further, the ADAAA expanded the nonexclusive list of major life activities 
to encompass, for example, several major bodily functions.38  
Although the ADAAA clarified Congress’s intent with regard to the 
definition of a disability under the ADA, and even included walking as a major life 
activity, it nevertheless left many other questions open, including whether driving 
is a major life activity and whether commuting-related accommodations are within 
the scope of the statute.39 Despite this, Congress’s statement of intent in 
amending the ADA was a clear endorsement of a broader, more inclusive 
interpretation of the statute.40  
B. Intent 
In drafting the ADA, Congress found that individuals with disabilities 
“occupy an inferior status in our society” and traditionally experience isolation and 
segregation.41 Congress further found that individuals with disabilities face 
frequent and pervasive discrimination that denies these individuals the 
“opportunity to compete on an equal basis” and costs the United States “billions 
of dollars in unnecessary expenses resulting from dependency and 
nonproductivity.”42  
As a result of these findings, Congress intended the ADA to “provide a clear 
and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against 
individuals with disabilities.”43 The ADA was further intended to “provide broad 
coverage”44 to individuals with disabilities in the hope that these individuals would 
have the opportunity to become productive and successful members of society.45  
In order to achieve the statutory goal of equal opportunities for individuals 
with disabilities, courts should adopt a case-by-case approach to commuting-
related accommodations. If employees with disabilities cannot get to the 
workplace, then providing reasonable accommodations inside the workplace does 
little to ensure equal opportunities. Moreover, allowing employers to dismiss all 
requests that resemble commuting-related accommodations does nothing to end 
discrimination—in fact, it may even perpetuate the stereotypes that the ADA was 
meant to end.  
 
37. Id. 
38. 42 U.S.C. § 12101. 
39. See id. 
40. See ADA Amendments Act, § 4, 122 Stat. at 3555–57 (2008); see also Joseph A. Seiner, 
Pleading Disability, 51 B.C. L. REV. 95, 108 (2010). 
41. 42 U.S.C. § 12101. 
42. Id. 
43. Id. 
44. ADA Amendments Act, 122 Stat. 3553. 
45. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 24 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 313. 
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C. Framework and Case Law 
Courts have adopted three approaches to cases on commuting-related 
accommodations: (1) holding that the individual is not disabled because driving is 
not a major life activity,46 (2) holding that commuting-related accommodations are 
outside the scope of the ADA,47 and (3) holding that commuting-related 
accommodations can be reasonable under the circumstances.48 This Note does 
not discuss the holding—that driving is not a major life activity—because the 
issue of disability under the statute is separate from the reasonableness of an 
accommodation. Discussion here will focus on the concept of disability under the 
ADA only to the extent that Congress’s amendment of the original definition of 
disability through the ADAAA provides support for a broader reading of the 
statute itself.  
This Note assumes that an employee who requests a commuting-related 
accommodation is disabled under the ADA, and addresses only the circuit split 
over whether this accommodation is within the scope of the ADA based on the 
legislative history and intent of the statute. This Note then argues that courts 
should adopt a case-by-case approach to commuting-related accommodations as 
the approach that is most consistent with the intent and goals of the ADA. 
1. Reasonable Accommodations Overview 
In addition to prohibiting discrimination in employment decisions, the ADA 
imposes on employers an affirmative duty to provide reasonable accommodations 
for the known limitations of employees with disabilities49 unless providing the 
accommodations would create undue hardship.50 Before the court will perform an 
inquiry into the reasonableness of an accommodation, however, the plaintiff must 
show that he or she is qualified for the position under the ADA.51 A qualified 
 
46. See, e.g., Winsley v. Cook Cnty., 563 F.3d 598 (7th Cir. 2009); Kellogg v. Energy Safety 
Servs. Inc., 544 F.3d 1121, 1124–26 (10th Cir. 2008) (holding that a safety technician who had 
epilepsy and was not released to drive was not a disabled individual under the ADA because driving 
was not a major life activity, as its importance significantly depended on factors such as nearness to 
transportation); Chenoweth v. Hillsborough Cnty., 250 F.3d 1328 (11th Cir. 2001). 
47. See, e.g., Bull v. Coyner, No. 98 C. 7583, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1905, at *25 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 
17, 2000); Salmon v. Dade Cnty. Sch. Bd., 4 F. Supp. 2d 1157 (S.D. Fla. 1998); Schneider v. Cont’l 
Cas. Co., No. 95 C. 1820, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19631 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 16, 1996). 
48. See e.g., Lyons v. Legal Aid Soc’y, 68 F.3d 1512, 1516 (2d Cir. 1995); Colwell v. Rite Aid 
Corp., 602 F.3d 495 (3d Cir. 2010); Livingston v. Fred Meyer Stores, Inc., No. 08-35597, 388 F. 
App’x 738 (9th Cir. 2010). 
49. 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (2006). 
50. Id.; Elizabeth Clark Morin, Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990: Social Integration Through 
Employment, 40 CATH. U.L. REV. 189, 199 (1990). 
51. Burke & Abel, supra note 21; see 42 U.S.C. § 12111 (2006) (defining “qualified individual”); 
42 U.S.C. § 12112 (prohibiting discrimination against a qualified individual). 
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individual can perform the essential functions of the job with or without 
reasonable accommodations.52  
The qualified individual inquiry is a very complicated area of the ADA 
analysis because every position requires a different set of essential functions. For 
some jobs, it is essential to be able to arrive on time, which can be difficult for 
people dependent on public transportation. People with disabilities are often 
dependent on public transportation because their disabilities prevent them from 
driving.53 For these jobs, an individual with disabilities may not be classified as a 
qualified individual because he or she cannot perform essential job functions even 
with accommodations. In order to decide this issue, courts must apply a case-by-
case analysis of the job specifics, the tasks required, and the accommodations 
requested. 
The last and arguably most important component of the ADA framework is 
the reasonable accommodations provision.54 An employer is required to provide 
reasonable accommodations to employees with disabilities,55 which may include 
“making existing facilities used by employees readily accessible . . . and usable,”56 
as well as offering the option of “job restructuring, part-time or modified work 
schedules, reassignment to a vacant position,” and other statutory 
accommodations.57 Determining whether an accommodation is reasonable 
requires a case by case analysis.58 The ADA does not require a plaintiff to prove 
that an accommodation falls within an employer’s obligations under the statute as 
an element of the cause of action. This suggests that Congress intended the 
employer to bear the burden of proving that the accommodation falls outside its 
statutory obligations as an affirmative defense. 
An employer may, however, reject a reasonable accommodation if the 
accommodation causes undue hardship,59 which the ADA defines as subjecting 
the employer to “significant difficulty or expense” when considered in light of a 
number of factors in the statute.60 Courts that reached the issue of reasonableness 
in commuting-related accommodation cases have adopted one of the following 
 
52. 42 U.S.C. § 12111. 
53. See Michael Lewyn, “Thou Shalt Not Put a Stumbling Block Before the Blind”: The Americans with 
Disabilities Act and Public Transit for the Disabled, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 1037 (2001). 
54. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 34 (noting that the “provision of various types of 
reasonable accommodations for individuals with various types of disabilities is essential to 
accomplishing the critical goal of this legislation—to allow individuals with disabilities to be part of 
the economic mainstream of our society”). 
55. 42 U.S.C. § 12112. 
56. 42 U.S.C. § 12111. 
57. Id. 
58. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 49; 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(d), app. (2012); Jeffrey O. 
Cooper, Overcoming Barriers to Employment: The Meaning of Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship in 
the Americans with Disabilities Act, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1423, 1457 (1991). 
59. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A). 
60. 42 U.S.C. § 12111. 
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two approaches: (1) holding that commuting-related accommodations are outside 
the scope of the ADA,61 or (2) holding that commuting-related accommodations 
may be reasonable under the circumstances.62 The case-by-case approach is most 
consistent with the ADA’s legislative history and purpose. 
2. Not Required by the ADA 
Some courts decide ADA claims that involve commuting issues by holding 
that commuting is outside the scope of employers’ statutory obligations. Courts 
using this approach assert that the ADA addresses discrimination with respect to 
the “terms, condition, or privilege of employment.”63 Finding that commuting 
falls outside the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because 
commuting is outside the bounds of the physical workplace, these courts thus find 
that employers are not required to accommodate such commuting issues under 
the ADA. While the two key Seventh Circuit cases that adopted this approach 
were not the first to hold that problems outside the workplace do not require 
accommodation, they are generally cited for the proposition that commuting-
related accommodations are outside the scope of the ADA.  
The Seventh Circuit first adopted this approach in Schneider v. Continental 
Casualty Company.64 The plaintiff was a loss control representative who suffered 
from severe back pain that prevented her from driving the one-hour commute to 
her position. Citing to an opinion letter from the EEOC’s Deputy General 
Counsel, which stated that employers are only required to provide reasonable 
accommodations that eliminate barriers inside the work environment, and not 
those external to the work environment, the court held that the defendant was not 
required to accommodate the plaintiff’s commuting-related difficulties because 
they occur outside the work environment.65 
The Seventh Circuit then affirmed this approach in Bull v. Conyer.66 The 
plaintiff was a human resources director who was diagnosed with retinitis 
pigmentosa, a condition that rendered him legally blind and completely prevented 
him from driving.67 After the plaintiff was terminated, he filed an ADA suit 
asserting that his employer had failed to reasonably accommodate his disability by 
 
61. See, e.g., Bull v. Coyner, No. 98 C. 7583, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1905, at *25 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 
17, 2000); Salmon v. Dade Cnty. Sch. Bd., 4 F. Supp. 2d 1157 (S.D. Fla. 1998); Schneider v. Cont’l 
Cas. Co., No. 95 C. 1820, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19631 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 16, 1996). 
62. See, e.g., Colwell v. Rite Aid Corp., 602 F.3d 495 (3d Cir. 2010); Livingston v. Fred Meyer 
Stores, Inc., 388 F. App’x 738 (9th Cir. 2010); Lyons v. Legal Aid Soc’y, 68 F.3d 1512, 1516 (2d Cir. 
1995). 
63. Bull, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1905, at *25 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12112). 
64. Schneider, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19631. 
65. Id. at *24. 
66. Bull, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1905, at *25. 
67. Id. at *3. 
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continuing to give him night shifts and by not requiring other employees to drive 
him to and from work.68  
The Bull court reasoned that because accommodations are directed at 
enabling an employee to perform the essential functions of the job, and because 
commuting to and from work is outside the scope of the job, commuting-related 
accommodations are outside the scope of the employer’s obligations under the 
ADA.69 After holding that both of the plaintiff’s requested accommodations were 
essentially commuting-related, the court held that the defendant had no obligation 
to provide them.70 
Citing to Schneider, a district court in the Eleventh Circuit also held that 
commuting-related problems are outside the scope of the employer’s obligations 
under the ADA.71 In Salmon v. Dade County School Board, the Eleventh Circuit ruled 
that a plaintiff who suffered from a condition that caused her severe back pain 
and left her unable to drive for long periods was not entitled to a transfer to 
shorten her commute. Because the commute was a barrier outside of the work 
environment, the court reasoned that the plaintiff’s request need not be 
accommodated.72 
Similarly, several Third Circuit courts cited to Bull or Schneider in order to 
hold that commuting-related problems are outside the scope of the employer’s 
obligations under the ADA.73 In LaResca v. American Telephone & Telegraph, a Third 
Circuit district court held that an employer did not have an obligation to provide 
only day shifts to an employee who suffered from epilepsy and was unable to 
drive, despite the fact that he could not find any transportation to work at night.74 
Although the LaResca plaintiff filed suit under the New Jersey Law Against 
Discrimination (LAD), the court noted that the same framework that is used for 
interpreting the ADA is also used for interpreting the LAD.75 Citing to Bull, 
Schneider, and Salmon, the court held that “activities such as commuting to and 
from work fall outside the scope of the job and are therefore not within the scope 
of an employer’s obligations under the ADA.”76 
In Parker v. Verizon Pennsylvania, Inc., the Third Circuit held once again that an 
employer had no duty to transfer an employee in order to shorten his commute 
 
68. Id. at *24. 
69. Id. at *24–25. 
70. Id. 
71. Salmon v. Dade Cnty. Sch. Bd., 4 F. Supp. 2d 1157 (S.D. Fla. 1998). 
72. Id. at 1163. 
73. Parker v. Verizon Pa., Inc., 309 F. App’x 551 (3d. Cir. 2009); Dicino v. Aetna U.S. 
Healthcare, No. 01-3206, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26487, at *51–52 (D. N.J. June 23, 2003) (holding 
that the employer need not accommodate the plaintiff’s requests to work from home because 
employers are not required to accommodate commuting-related problems); LaResca v. Am. Tel. & 
Tel., 161 F. Supp. 2d 323, 333–34 (D. N.J. 2001). 
74. LaResca, 161 F. Supp. 2d at 333. 
75. Id. at 334. 
76. Id. The court offered little reasoning other than citing to cases that used this approach. 
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because this barrier existed outside the work environment.77 Instead of explaining 
its reasoning, the court cited to LaResca, which adopted the Seventh Circuit’s 
reasoning in Bull and Schneider, to support the proposition that commuting-related 
accommodations are outside the scope of the ADA.78 
Likewise, an Arkansas district court held that even if an employee’s request 
for only day shifts was a required accommodation under the ADA, it was 
unreasonable.79 In Young-Parker v. AT&T, the plaintiff suffered from severe 
fibromyalgia, a degenerative joint condition that prevented her from driving at 
night. The court noted that while the Eighth Circuit did not address “whether an 
accommodation related to an employee’s commute is required under the ADA,” 
other circuits held that this accommodation was not required. The court also held 
that even if the employee’s commuting-related problems were within the 
employer’s obligations under the ADA, the plaintiff’s request was unreasonable 
because it would prevent the employer from offering day shifts to other, more 
qualified individuals who had seniority.80 
3. Case-by-Case Reasonableness Under the Circumstances 
Other courts address these cases by holding that commuting-related 
accommodations may be reasonable under the circumstances. This approach is 
most consistent with the ADA’s text and may, in fact, be necessary to realize its 
goals. Far fewer cases, however, have adopted a case-by-case reasonableness 
approach, although the majority of these cases arose or were decided within the 
last several years. 
One of the first cases holding that commuting-related accommodations 
could be reasonable under the circumstances was Lyons v. Legal Aid Society, which 
involved an attorney employed by the Legal Aid Society in lower Manhattan who 
was struck by an automobile that inflicted near-fatal injuries and severely limited 
 
77. Parker, 309 F App’x at 561. In Parker, the plaintiff was diagnosed with sarcoidosis, an 
autoimmune disease causing pulmonary inflammation and fibrosis. His condition affected his ability 
to breathe and talk and made it difficult for him to commute long distances. After his request for a 
transfer was denied, he filed suit under the ADA. The court cited Kvorjak v. Maine, 259 F.3d 48, 53 
(1st Cir. 2001), in support of its holding that an employee’s commute is not part of the work 
environment and that an employer is not reasonably required to accommodate commuting-related 
difficulties. 
78. See id. 
79. Young-Parker v. AT&T, No. 4:09-CV-00202, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114997 (E.D. Ark. 
Apr. 29, 2009). 
80. While the court did not say that commuting-related accommodations are always 
unreasonable, shift changes impose relatively little hardship on employers facing requests to 
accommodate their employees’ commuting-related problems. If the court found this request to be 
unreasonable, then it is hard to imagine a request that it would consider reasonable. 
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her ability to walk long distances. 81 The attorney asked the Legal Aid Society to 
pay for a parking space near her office and the court where she worked.82 
The lower court in Lyons held that the ADA did not impose this obligation 
on employers and dismissed her complaint.83 However, the Second Circuit 
reversed the dismissal, noting that “[i]t [was] clear . . . that Congress envisioned 
that employer assistance with transportation to get the employee to and from the 
job might be covered.”84 The court held that determining the reasonableness of 
such accommodations would require the development of a factual record and 
should be done on a flexible, case-specific basis. 
Lyons paved the way for other courts to hold that commuting-related 
accommodations can be reasonable under the circumstances.85 In 2010, the Third 
Circuit held in Colwell v. Rite-Aid that “under certain circumstances the ADA can 
obligate an employer to accommodate an employee’s disability-related difficulties 
in getting to work, if reasonable.”86 In Colwell, an employee developed blindness in 
one eye and requested day shifts to avoid driving at night.  
The district court held that employers had no duty to accommodate 
commuting-related issues and granted summary judgment for the defendant.87 The 
Third Circuit reversed, however, noting that one circumstance where an employer 
may have a duty to accommodate an employee’s commuting-related difficulties is 
where the “condition . . . is entirely within an employer’s control.”88 
The Ninth Circuit followed Colwell’s reasoning in Livingston v. Fred Meyer 
Stores, Inc.89 In Livingston, the plaintiff was a wine steward who suffered from a 
vision impairment that left her unable to safely drive and walk outside at night.90 
She requested a modified work schedule to avoid driving at night during the fall 
and winter. Her employer granted her request the first year but denied it the 
second year; she refused to work her scheduled shifts and was fired. 
 
81. Lyons v. Legal Aid Soc’y, 68 F.3d 1512, 1516 (2d Cir. 1995). The court also stated that 
there was nothing unreasonable about requiring employers to offer reasonable accommodations to 
otherwise qualified individuals in order to assist them in getting to work. 
82. Id. at 1513. 
83. Id. at 1514. 
84. Id. at 1516. The court also stated that there was nothing unreasonable about requiring 
employers to make reasonable accommodations to assist otherwise-qualified individuals in getting to 
work. Id. 
85. See Carrie G. Basas, Back Rooms, Board Rooms—Reasonable Accommodation and Resistance Under 
the ADA, 29 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 59, 94 (“Lyons has cleared a rough-hewn path towards 
introducing other transportation-related reasonable accommodations.”). 
86. Colwell v. Rite-Aid, 602 F.3d 495, 505 (3d Cir. 2010). 
87. Id. at 499–500. 
88. Id. at 505. The court noted in dicta that Colwell did not render employers responsible for 
how employees travel to work because the plaintiff did not ask for help in the methods or means of 
her commute. Id. at 506. 
89. Livingston v. Fred Meyer Stores, Inc., 388 F. App’x 738 (9th Cir. 2010). 
90. Id. at 739. 
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The district court declined to require an employer to accommodate 
commuting-related limitations.91 The Ninth Circuit, however, reversed the lower 
court’s grant of summary judgment and noted that modified work schedules are 
listed as reasonable accommodations under the ADA.92 Further, it held that the 
plaintiff raised a triable issue of material fact on whether the defendant failed to 
reasonably accommodate her. In so doing, the court “recognized that an employer 
has a duty to accommodate an employee’s limitations in getting to and from 
work.”93 
II. ANALYSIS OF THE PROPER METHOD FOR ADDRESSING COMMUTING-
RELATED ACCOMMODATIONS 
Based on an analysis of the ADA’s legislative intent, the best approach to 
commuting-related accommodations is the case-by-case approach implemented in 
Colwell and Livingston. By providing that the “definition of disability in this Act 
shall be construed in favor of broad coverage of individuals under this Act,”94 the 
ADA as amended by the ADAAA clearly indicates Congress’s intent for courts to 
adopt a broader definition of the term “disability” than the one adopted following 
the Supreme Court’s decisions in Toyota and Sutton. Congress’s broadening of this 
definition and its instruction to courts to focus on whether employers have 
fulfilled their obligations under the ADA (rather than on whether the individual is 
disabled) can be seen as a broader instruction to courts to focus on the overall 
intent and goals of the ADA instead of finding ways to quickly dispose of cases. 
The ADAAA also conveys that ADA cases should emphasize whether an 
employer upheld its obligations under the ADA rather than whether an employee 
is disabled under the statute.95 
Additionally, the ADA’s purpose is to enable individuals with disabilities to 
become productive members of society through the enjoyment of equal 
opportunities.96 It is not enough to provide reasonable accommodations to 
individuals with disabilities inside the workplace without providing reasonable 
accommodations that allow disabled individuals to reach the workplace. After 
discussing the implications of the circuit split described in Section I above, this 
Section explains why a bright-line rule that excludes commuting-related 
accommodations as outside the scope of the ADA leads to the wrong result and 
why a case-by-case approach that examines the reasonableness of the 
accommodations under the circumstances leads to the correct result. 
 
91. Id. at 740. 
92. Id. at 740–41 (citing Colwell, 602 F.3d at 506). 
93. Id. at 740. 
94. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(4) (2006). 
95. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 4, 122 Stat. 3553, 3559 (2008). 
96. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101. 
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A. Commuting-Related Accommodations Should Not Be Outside the Scope of the ADA 
The approach to commuting-related accommodations that holds them to be 
outside the scope of the ADA, or per se unreasonable, ignores the intent and 
purpose of the statute. In the House Notes on the ADA, Congress 
“acknowledged that ‘modified work schedules can provide useful 
accommodations’ and noted that ‘persons who may require modified work 
schedules are persons with mobility impairments who depend on a public 
transportation system that is not currently fully accessible.’”97 In its Interpretive 
Guidance on Title I of the ADA, the EEOC also noted that “[p]eople whose 
disabilities may need modified work schedules include . . . people with mobility 
and other impairments who find it difficult to use public transportation during 
peak hours, or who must depend upon special para-transit schedules.”98 
Additionally, the EEOC specifically stated that required accommodations might 
include “making employer provided transportation accessible, and providing 
reserved parking spaces.”99 Further, a House of Representatives Committee on 
Education and Labor report noted that an employee with disabilities who worked 
in an inaccessible shopping mall was entitled to employer assistance in getting to 
and from the job site.100 Quoting this language, the Colwell court reasoned that the 
ADA does not “strictly limit the breadth of reasonable accommodations to 
address only those problems that an employee has in performing her work that 
arise once she arrives at the workplace.”101 Instead, the statute provides that 
reasonable accommodations may include “part-time or modified work 
schedules.”102 Because the ADA explicitly includes modified work schedules as 
possible reasonable accommodations, and because modified work schedules are 
 
97. Colwell v. Rite Aid, 602 F.3d 495, 505 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, 
at 62–63 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 345). For more examples of courts associating 
modified work schedules with commuting-related accommodations, see Livingston, 388 F. App’x 738 
(reversing the lower court’s finding that a modified work schedule request was a commuting-related 
difficulty that was outside the scope of the ADA), LaResca v. American Telelephone & Telegraph, 161 F. 
Supp. 2d 323, 333 (D.N.J. 2001) (rejecting the employee’s request for only daytime shifts on the 
grounds that it was a commuting-related accommodation and thus outside the scope of the ADA), 
and Bull v. Coyner, No. 98 C. 7583, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1905, at *24–25 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 17, 2000) 
(rejecting an employee’s request for a modified work schedule on the grounds that it was a 
commuting-related accommodation). 
98. EEOC, A TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL ON THE EMPLOYMENT PROVISIONS 
(TITLE I) OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT § III-3.10(3) (1992). 
99. EEOC’s Interpretive Guidance on Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 29 C.F.R. 
pt. 1630, app. at 376 (2010). 
100. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 61 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 343. The 
House Report did not note whether the employee would be entitled to assistance to a specific store or 
how that employee should be assisted. But it did note that the employer should determine whether 
the individual with disabilities was qualified for the position and could reach the job site with a 
reasonable accommodation. 
101. Colwell, 602 F.3d at 505. 
102. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (2006). 
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often associated with commuting-related difficulties, courts may infer that 
Congress contemplated commuting-related accommodations when enacting the 
statute.103 That Congress did not list other possible commuting-related 
accommodations does not negate the fact that it referenced parking spaces and 
modified work schedules, both of which are often associated with commuting-
related difficulties. 
Thus, based on the statutory language, the House Notes, and the EEOC’s 
Interpretive Guidance on the statute, it is clear that both Congress and the EEOC 
have recognized that commuting-related accommodations may be reasonable 
under the circumstances. Holding them automatically outside the scope of 
employers’ obligations is therefore contrary to what Congress and the EEOC have 
envisioned.104 Moreover, the findings section of the ADA provides that “the 
Nation’s proper goals regarding individuals with disabilities are to assure equality 
of opportunity, full participation, independent living, and economic self-
sufficiency for such individuals.”105 Congress crafted the ADA with these findings 
in mind. It could not accomplish these goals, however, if the statute only covered 
disability-related problems inside the workplace because the resulting 
accommodations would be useless to individuals with disabilities who could not 
even access the workplace.  
The findings section of the ADA also provides that 
the continuing existence of unfair and unnecessary discrimination and 
prejudice denies people with disabilities the opportunity to compete on 
an equal basis and to pursue those opportunities for which our free 
society is justifiably famous, and costs the United States billions of dollars 
in unnecessary expenses resulting from dependency and non-
productivity.106 
If the inability of individuals with disabilities to travel to and from the workplace 
prevents them from holding productive jobs, they will be unable to compete on an 
equal basis. They will continue to be dependent on the United States government 
for support. Thus, accommodating only those problems that are confined to the 
physical bounds of the workplace would not realize the goal of assuring full 
participation and economic self-sufficiency for individuals with disabilities. 
Because this method would exclude many individuals who might be able to hold a 
meaningful job but for their inability to reach the workplace, these individuals 
would be unable to fully participate in society and become economically self-
sufficient. 
 
103. See Colwell, 602 F.3d at 505. 
104. See id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B); H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(II), at 62–63 (1990), 
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 330, 345. 
105. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2006). 
106. Id. 
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Moreover, the ADA has never required employees to demonstrate that their 
requested accommodations are within the scope of the ADA or employers’ 
obligations under the statute. Adding this requirement would mean that employees 
must not only demonstrate (1) that they have a disability under the ADA, (2) that 
they can perform the essential functions of the job with or without reasonable 
accommodations, and (3) that their requested accommodations are reasonable, but 
also (4) that their request is within their employer’s obligations under the ADA. 
This is unnecessary because the existing framework already limits 
accommodations that cause undue hardships for employers.107 Adding this 
requirement would increase the already strenuous burden on plaintiffs and 
improperly shift the employer’s burden of asserting the affirmative defense of 
undue hardship onto employees with disabilities. 
B. Why a Case-by-Case Approach Is Proper 
The correct approach to commuting-related accommodations is the case-by-
case approach adopted by the Second, Third, and Ninth Circuits. This approach 
conforms most closely to the intent and purpose of the Act and best achieves a 
balance between the interests of employers and employees.  
The EEOC’s guidance states that the reasonable accommodations analysis is 
a fact-specific inquiry that is performed on a case by case basis.108 An employer 
cannot determine reasonableness without examining the employee’s capabilities 
and qualifications, the essential functions of the job, and the implementation costs 
of the accommodation.  
As discussed earlier, the ADAAA clarified that Congress intended the ADA 
to provide broad coverage in order to promote equal opportunities and “address 
the major areas of discrimination faced day-to-day by people with disabilities.”109 
If the statute is not construed to provide broad coverage, then prejudice will 
continue to prevent individuals with disabilities from participating fully in society. 
Compared to the per se rule, a case-by-case approach is more in line with the 
broad coverage that Congress intended. 
Further, in the ADA’s findings section, Congress provided: 
[I]ndividuals with disabilities continually encounter various forms of 
discrimination, including outright intentional exclusion, the 
discriminatory effects of architectural, transportation, and 
communication barriers, overprotective rules and policies, failure to make 
modifications to existing facilities and practices, exclusionary qualification 
 
107. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (2006). 
108. 29 C.F.R. § 1630, app. (2012); see H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 49, reprinted in 1990 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 314; Cooper, supra note 58, at 1457. 
109. 42 U.S.C. § 12101. 
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standards and criteria, segregation, and relegation to lesser services, 
programs, activities, benefits, jobs, or other opportunities.110 
These findings reflect the ADA’s purpose of mandating the “elimination of 
discrimination against individuals with disabilities.”111 If an employer denies an 
employee’s request for accommodations before making fact-specific inquiries, 
then its decision is likely to be arbitrary or biased. The reasonable 
accommodations framework is best for achieving the ADA’s goals because it 
instead forces employers to assess employees with disabilities on the basis of their 
merit.112 
Essentially, a policy that excludes all commuting-related accommodations 
without regard for whether the accommodations are reasonable allows employers 
to fire their employees on the basis of their disabilities through a statutory 
loophole. By contrast, a policy that compels a case-by-case evaluation of 
commuting-related accommodations requires employers to judge their employees 
on the basis of their qualifications.  
Additionally, a case-by-case approach best achieves a balance between the 
competing interests of employers and employees. Under this approach, employees 
can attempt to show that their commuting-related accommodations are reasonable 
under the circumstances. This does not mean, however, that employers must grant 
requested accommodations. Instead, employers can attempt to show that the 
accommodations are unduly burdensome or that they eliminate an essential job 
function.113 
When an employer successfully shows that a commuting-related 
accommodation is unreasonable—for instance, when the requested 
accommodation subverts an established seniority system114—the employer should 
have no duty to grant it.115 But before an employer can refuse an accommodation, 
it should be required to consider the request under the ADA framework to 
determine that it is, in fact, unreasonable.  
 
110. Id. 
111. Id. 
112. See Basas, supra note 85, at 113 (“[A]n employer short-changes the interactive process 
when she automatically concludes that an accommodation is outside the scope of the company’s 
operations, without creating a dialogue with the employee about alternatives and her sources of 
concern.”). 
113. See Colwell v. Rite-Aid, 602 F.3d 495, 506 (3d Cir. 2010) (applying a case-by-case 
approach to commuting-related accommodations, but noting that the employer had not argued that 
the requested accommodation created undue hardship and that “those questions are ultimately for the 
jury”). 
114. See U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 394 (2002) (noting that an employer is not 
ordinarily required to assign a employee with a disability to a position that another employee is 
entitled to hold under an established seniority system; the employee with a disability has the burden of 
showing that the requested accommodation is nonetheless reasonable). 
115. See id. 
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A case-by-case approach will also not significantly broaden the scope of 
employers’ obligations or cause much uncertainty. Admittedly, this approach 
requires employers to invest more effort in examining commuting-related 
accommodations. Specifically, employers may need to assess more factors in 
determining the reasonableness of accommodations outside the physical 
workplace than inside the workplace, where the circumstances are entirely within 
their control. Additionally, they will need to offer more accommodations than if 
commuting-related difficulties were automatically considered outside the scope of 
their obligations under the ADA.  
A case-by case approach to requests for accommodations outside the 
workplace, however, follows the same framework as requests for accommodations 
inside the workplace. Thus, by carefully analyzing the requested accommodations, 
employers will equally be able to determine which commuting-related 
accommodations and non-commuting related accommodations are reasonable or 
unreasonable. They will also be able to assert the defense of undue hardship or 
argue that a commuting-related accommodation will eliminate an essential job 
function. Therefore, a case-by-case approach will merely be consistent with the 
framework already applied to requests for accommodations inside the workplace 
and will not radically change the scope of employers’ duties under the ADA.  
Finally, a case-by-case approach is the only approach that avoids drawing 
arbitrary doctrinal lines. It is irrational to hold that modifications to the 
architecture of a building can be reasonable116 while simultaneously holding that 
parking spaces or shift changes are per se unreasonable or beyond the scope of 
the ADA. Ending an employer’s statutory obligations at the doorway to the 
workplace is illogical because of the absence of a principled justification for 
providing elevators inside the building, but not parking spaces directly outside it. 
A case-by-case approach avoids the meaningless distinction between the elevator 
and the adjacent parking area and draws a more rational line at whether or not an 
accommodation is reasonable. 
C. Benefits and Drawbacks of a Case-by-Case Approach 
Although the flexible case-by-case approach is best for addressing 
commuting-related accommodations, it is not without drawbacks. While this 
approach allows courts to assess the needs of individuals with disabilities more 
closely, it also compels employers to examine more factors and litigate more cases. 
Suits that would never be litigated, or would be dismissed early under a bright-line 
rule, may be fully litigated under a case-by-case-approach. Considering the length 
and cost of many ADA cases, employers may thus be forced to expend valuable 
resources on litigation when they could have used these resources to 
accommodate their employees. Thus, a bright-line rule that excludes commuting-
 
116. 42 U.S.C. § 12111 (2006). 
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related accommodations or labels them inherently unreasonable may allow 
employers to better anticipate which requested accommodations must be granted. 
This would enable employers to better allocate their resources. 
However, a case-by-case approach counters these drawbacks by allowing 
courts to prevent discrimination while also better meeting the needs of individuals 
with disabilities. While this approach does expand the scope of employers’ ADA 
obligations and associated litigation costs, it does not impose a new, unfamiliar 
standard; employers already interpret the reasonable accommodations framework 
for problems occurring inside the workplace. And, while it is true that this 
approach may increase the costs of litigation, all statutes that provide a group with 
rights and a means to sue to protect those rights increase litigation. The need for 
statutes protecting suppressed minorities outweighs the risk of increased litigation 
expenses.117  
Additionally, a case-by-case approach may increase the courts’ docket loads. 
Instead of granting early dismissals in commuting-related cases, such as on a 
motion to dismiss or motion for summary judgment, courts will generally need to 
allow more fact gathering. Again, however, courts will not be forced to apply a 
new, unfamiliar standard because courts already apply the reasonable 
accommodations framework to problems occurring inside the workplace. Further, 
while efficiency and workload are certainly valid considerations, they are 
outweighed by the compelling individual rights at stake.  
Finally, one might ask why employers (not the government or the employees 
with disabilities themselves) should be responsible for commuting-related costs. 
Because this Note does not argue for an extension of already existing law, but 
instead argues that commuting-related accommodations are within the scope of 
the ADA, it assumes that Congress has already made this policy determination and 
attempts only to resolve a circuit split based on an in-depth look into the ADA’s 
legislative history and intent. 
III. GUIDANCE FOR IMPLEMENTING A CASE-BY-CASE APPROACH 
The ADA itself provides little guidance on defining reasonable 
accommodations. However, the EEOC has issued its own regulations on the 
 
117. It is important to consider the argument that construing the ADA more broadly will 
create a backlash, prompting employers to hesitate to hire disabled employees. While the ADA 
prohibits employers from discriminating against disabled employees in employment decisions, many 
scholars question the effectiveness of the ADA and its reasonable accommodations framework. For 
a discussion of the relevant competing literature, see Robert C. Bird & John D. Knopf, Do Disability 
Laws Impair Firm Performance?, 47 AM. BUS. L.J. 145, 168–82 (2010); see also Samuel R. Bagenstos, 
The Future of Disability Law, 114 YALE L.J. 1, 20 (2004) (noting that certain commentators argue that 
the ADA increases unemployment for individuals with disabilities because the cost of 
accommodations has created an incentive for employers to refuse to hire them, and that this problem 
is compounded by the fact that the ADA’s antidiscrimination provisions are difficult to enforce at the 
hiring stage). 
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subject,118 and courts addressing commuting-related accommodations under the 
case-by-case approach have assessed several factors in making their 
determinations.119 First, courts should investigate the costs of the accommodation 
to the employer.120 Next, they should assess the employer’s financial resources, 
including all available outside funding.121 Further, they should inspect the 
employer’s geographic location.122 Since these factors are not exclusive, courts 
may consider other similar factors, including the type of operation, the impact of 
the accommodation on other employees, and the impact of the accommodation 
on the facility.123 While this Section provides examples of accommodations that 
should receive a presumption of reasonableness, accommodations that should 
receive a presumption of unreasonableness, and accommodations that do not 
clearly fit into either category, it is important for courts to decide each case by 
examining the specific facts involved.124  
A. Presumption of Reasonableness 
Certain commuting-related accommodations should be presumptively 
reasonable, but courts should allow the employer to rebut this presumption by 
showing undue hardship. These accommodations should include “change[s] to a 
workplace condition that [are] entirely within an employer’s control and that 
would allow the employee to get to work and perform her job,”125 for example, 
modified work schedules for employees who seek to avoid night shifts126 and paid 
parking spaces for employees who are unable to walk to work at locations with 
limited available parking.127 
 
118. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(p) (2012). 
119. Lyons v. Legal Aid Soc’y, 68 F.3d 1512, 1517 (2d Cir. 1995); Borkowski v. Valley Cent. 
Sch. Dist., 63 F.3d 131, 140 (2d Cir. 1995). 
120. Lyons, 68 F.3d at 1517; Borkowski, 63 F.3d at 140; see 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(p)(2)(i) (providing 
that courts should consider “the nature and net cost of the accommodation needed under this part, 
taking into consideration the availability of tax credits and deductions, and/or outside funding”). 
121. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(p)(2)(ii); Lyons, 68 F.3d at 1516. 
122. Lyons, 68 F.3d at 1516; see 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(p)(2)(iii) (providing that courts should 
consider the type and location of an entity’s facilities). 
123. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(2)(iv)–(v). 
124. Enforcement Guidance: Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship Under the 
Americans with Disabilities Act, 2002 WL 31994335 (E.E.O.C. Guidance Oct. 17, 2002). 
125. Colwell v. Rite-Aid, 602 F.3d 495, 505 (3d Cir. 2010). 
126. According to EEOC regulations promulgated under the ADA, modified work schedules 
are examples of reasonable accommodations. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(2)(ii). However, for positions 
where timeliness is an essential job function, modified work schedules might be unreasonable. As 
discussed above, the concept of essential functions is larger than this Note can address. 
127. As noted above, the Lyons court upheld a request for a paid parking space on the grounds 
that the request could be a reasonable accommodation. Lyons, 68 F.3d 1512; see also Basas, supra note 
85, at 90–91 (“Parking can be one of the most cost-effective and easily implemented forms of 
transportation-related accommodation for people with disabilities who can drive and have access to 
cars.”). In discussing why employers should provide parking spaces when it does not impose undue 
hardship, Basas notes that (1) parking can “be a ramp of sorts to the workplace,” (2) parking is 
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For modified work schedules, an employer could rebut the presumption of 
reasonableness if granting an employee’s shift request would interfere with an 
established seniority system.128 In U.S. Airways v. Barnett, the Supreme Court held 
that an employer has no obligation to give preference to an employee with 
disabilities over qualified individuals with more seniority unless the employee with 
disabilities has evidence of special circumstances.129 For example, a court may find 
an accommodation unreasonable if granting an employee with disabilities the right 
to work only day shifts interferes with a system that rewards senior employees 
with the right to pick their shifts or if the employee fails to present evidence of 
special circumstances.130 
Alternatively, an employer could demonstrate undue hardship if the 
employee’s position requires extensive training and could be filled by one 
individual on the condition that he or she could work any shift. In this case, the 
employer might have to invest much time and money in training a second 
employee to work only night shifts, a cost that it could avoid by hiring a single 
individual able to work both day and night shifts. Accordingly, the cost of training 
a second employee might impose undue hardship on an employer that is relatively 
small and financially limited. 
B. Generally Unreasonable  
On the other hand, some accommodations, including floating start and end 
times, should generally be considered unreasonable unless the employee can show 
that such accommodations do not modify the essential job functions.131 Since 
predictability is often critical to determining schedules and generally necessary for 
conducting business,132 most positions require employers to know when 
employees will arrive at work.133 However, although floating start and end times 
would create unpredictability for employers and would generally be 
 
sometimes part of the employment package that is provided to employees, and (3) parking can be 
relatively inexpensive. Id. 
128. See U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 394 (2002); Young-Parker v. AT&T 
Mobility Corp., No. 4:09-CV-00202, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114997 (E.D. Ark. Dec. 9, 2009). 
129. U.S. Airways, 535 U.S. at 394. The court noted that special circumstances could include 
showing that the employer can unilaterally change the seniority system and does so frequently, so that 
employees do not expect the system to be followed. Thus, it seems that merely needing the 
accommodation is not enough to overcome the presumption that an accommodation that would 
cause an employer to violate a seniority system is unreasonable.  
130. However, in its Interpretive Guidance on Title I of the ADA, the EEOC states that 
accommodations that merely interfere with other employees’ morale do not create undue hardship. 
Enforcement Guidance: Reasonable Accommodation & Undue Hardship Under the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, 2002 WL 31994335 (Oct. 17, 2002). 
131. See Pagonakis v. Express LLC, 534 F. Supp. 2d 453 (D. Del. 2008) (holding an employee’s 
requests for late arrivals and early dismissals without penalty unreasonable because they modified the 
essential functions of the job). 
132. See Salmon v. Dade Cnty. Sch. Bd., 4 F. Supp. 2d 1157, 1162 (S.D. Fla. 1998). 
133. See, e.g., Pagonakis, 534 F. Supp. 2d 453; Salmon, 4 F. Supp. 2d 1157. 
UCILR V2I3 Assembled v8 (Do Not Delete) 12/14/2012  5:35 PM 
1044 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2:1023 
 
unreasonable,134 a court should conduct a fact-specific inquiry into the 
circumstances of the case and the costs to the employer before making that 
determination. 
C. More Difficult Requests 
The more difficult cases involve accommodations that impose higher costs, 
such as the payment of transportation expenses and the provision of 
transportation. The reasonableness of these accommodations depends on an 
individual employer’s size and resources. These accommodations may impose less 
hardship and therefore be more reasonable for larger employers with more 
resources. They may also depend on the salary of the employee and his or her 
value to the employer.135  
For example, if the employer is a national corporation with many resources, 
and if the employee with disabilities lives outside of walking distance but within 
several miles of the workplace, then it might be reasonable for the employer to 
pay transportation costs because, based on an assessment of the factors listed 
above, the accommodation would likely not be an undue hardship.136 Moreover, if 
an employee without disabilities lives near the employee with disabilities, then it 
might also be reasonable for the employer to pay that employee to drive the 
employee with disabilities to and from work. 
Courts should generally consider employers’ financial resources in 
determining whether a requested accommodation imposes undue hardship.137 But 
the undue hardship assessment will necessarily require more information regarding 
an employer’s financial situation where the accommodation is more expensive. 
Thus, while all inquiries into the reasonableness of an accommodation require an 
individualized review, these accommodations will require an even closer, more 
 
134. See, e.g., Pagonakis, 534 F. Supp. 2d 453; Salmon, 4 F. Supp. 2d 1157.  
135. See, e.g., Vande Zande v. Wis. Dep’t of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 543 (7th Cir. 1995) (noting 
that the ADA’s legislative history equates “undue hardship” to “unduly costly” and that “these are 
terms of relation. . . . [p]resumably . . . to the benefits of the accommodation to the disabled worker as 
well as to the employer’s resources”). Therefore, an employee must first show that the 
accommodation is reasonable “in the sense both of efficacious and of proportional to costs.” Id. If 
this showing is met, the employer then has a chance to show that the costs are excessive “in relation 
either to the benefits of the accommodation or to the employer’s financial survival or health.” Id. For 
instance, an accommodation costing more than the employee’s salary would likely be found to be 
unreasonable or, alternatively, to impose undue hardship. 
136. See id. (suggesting that the reasonableness of an accommodation depends partly on the 
employer’s resources and the cost of the accommodation in proportion to those resources). This 
accommodation might impose less hardship if the employer is large and has many resources, and if 
the employee lives nearby and therefore needs lower transportation costs. However, it might impose 
more hardship if the employer is small and has few resources, and if the employee lives farther away 
and thus necessitates higher transportation costs. 
137. See generally 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(p)(2) (2012). 
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fact-specific examination because they involve high financial costs and more 
resources. 
CONCLUSION 
In order for Congress to achieve its goal of enabling individuals with 
disabilities to keep their jobs, and become productive members of society it is not 
enough simply to prohibit discrimination and provide reasonable accommodations 
in the workplace. Individuals with disabilities must be able to reach the workplace. 
Thus, to fully realize the goals of the ADA, courts should apply a case-by-case 
approach to commuting-related accommodations. 
Lyons and the ADAAA have set the stage for courts to consider the 
reasonableness of commuting-related accommodations on a case-by-case basis. In 
Lyons, the court explicitly held that under the ADA, an employer may have an 
obligation to assist employees with disabilities in getting to and from work. 
Moreover, although the ADAAA did not address the issue of whether driving 
constitutes a major life activity and whether the ADA requires commuting-related 
accommodations, it reprimanded courts that narrowed the statute’s coverage and 
reminded them to construe the ADA more broadly.  
Thus, Lyons and the ADAAA provide compelling reasons for courts to 
address the reasonableness of commuting-related accommodations through a fact-
specific inquiry. After the promulgation of the ADAAA, it seems no coincidence 
that in 2010, the Third and Ninth Circuits applied a case-by-case approach to hold 
that commuting related accommodations may be reasonable under the 
circumstances.138 Both courts used a case-by-case approach to reverse a grant of 
summary judgment given on the grounds that these accommodations are 
automatically outside the scope of employers’ obligations.  
In order for individuals with disabilities to achieve their full potential, it is 
not enough to provide accommodations inside the workplace if they cannot reach 
the workplace. Further, a case-by-case approach is most consistent with the goals 
of preventing discrimination on the basis of disability and allowing equal 
opportunities for individuals with disabilities. Without a case-by-case approach, 
otherwise qualified individuals might be denied a position on the basis of 
prejudice. By contrast, a case-by-case approach forces employers to evaluate all 
employees on their merits. The case-by-case approach allows employees with 
disabilities to access the same employment opportunities as employees without 
disabilities. 
  
 
138. Specifically, the Colwell court cited to Lyons to support the proposition that commuting-
related accommodations may be reasonable under the circumstances. Colwell v. Rite Aid Corp., 602 
F.3d 495, 505 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Lyons v. Legal Aid Soc’y, 68 F.3d 1512, 1516 (2d Cir. 1995)). The 
Livingston court cited to Colwell to sustain its holding. Livingston v. Fred Meyers, No. 08-35597, 388 F. 
App’x 738, 740 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Colwell, 602 F.3d 495 at 506). 
